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Systematic Incident Command Training and Organisational 
Competence
Aim: To determine if the application of a systematic command training system (Effective 
Command) could influence the organisational competency profile, through the identification, 
training, and assessment of key behavioural markers. 
Design/methodology/approach: The Effective Command framework is aligned to UK National 
Fire Service role-maps and is routinely used in both development and assessment of Fire Officers 
worldwide. Data from 1261 formal assessments was analysed and descriptive statistics 
performed.  
Findings: Structured analysis of incident command assessment data should inform subsequent 
training cycles of individuals, organisations, and procedures. Key Behavioural Markers were 
identified in Level 1 (L1) and Level 2 (L2) commanders which influence assessment outcomes. 
Reduced competence scores between L1 and L2 officers were recorded, providing a strong 
argument for a supported development process for L2 officers. 
Practical implications: Six key behavioural markers were identified in L1 commanders, all were 
associated with information comprehension and evaluation, which ultimately impacted the 
outcomes of formal assessments. This study provides empirical evidence that frequent incident 
or scenario exposure, coupled with metacognitive understanding of the decision rationale could 
reverse these weaknesses and turn them into individual strengths. This in-depth analysis of data 
generated in individuals who pass or fail these assessments should strengthen organisational 
learning. 
Originality/value: The use of a structured command training framework contributes significantly 
to operational assurance by providing a robust assessment and training methodology, which 
ensures that organisations can appoint, train, and assess their Incident Commanders. 
Introduction 
The operational landscape and responsibilities of International Fire Services have changed 
dramatically over the last fifteen years, with terrorist attacks (Deeming, 2018), extreme weather 
events and complex fire prevention strategies, all greatly affecting the scope, severity and, 
importantly, numbers of incidents attended (Home Office, 2019). This dynamic operating 
landscape challenges fire services to implement change, adapt, innovate, and evolve to maintain 
service levels commensurate with community risk.  These challenges are further complicated by 
efficiency savings, resource reductions and additional non-operational responsibilities  (FBU, 
2015), increasing the demand for efficient and effective operational training that allows 
personnel to train for the unexpected. 
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Fire Officers are required to be technically proficient and operate in time critical, high-risk 
environments where fatalities and injuries are consistently linked to human errors  (Flin et al., 
2008; Shappell and Wiegmann, 1997). Their command decisions and the subsequent actions of 
their organisation may then be open to scrutiny during coronial proceedings, as seen recently in 
the United Kingdom (UK) with the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2019).  
Improving the safety of emergency services personnel and importantly the communities they 
serve, requires the development of technical excellence and command decision-making in 
tandem. Decision making skills are becoming recognised as a key part of a fire commander’s skill 
set, with  fire services increasingly seeking systematic validation of those skills, as well as training 
or management frameworks that incorporate and value them  (Butler et al., 2020; Cohen-Hatton 
et al., 2015a; Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015b) 
Competence is the combination of training, skills, experience and knowledge that a person has 
acquired and their ability to apply them to perform a task safely (HSE, 2020). Other factors which 
can affect competence are attitude and physical ability (HSE, 2020). The specific guidance from 
the UK Health & safety Executive (HSE) states ‘Competence in health and safety should be an 
important component of workplace activities, not an add-on or afterthought’. The acquisition 
and demonstration of competence should therefore be considered a principle component of fire 
service training. 
Competence or expert knowledge can be differentiated into two distinct groups: explicit 
knowledge and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is factually based, and traditionally taught in 
a classroom, but is proven of little use in generating effective skill-based training or decision-
making (Zsambok and Klein, 1997). Tacit knowledge involves a detailed understanding of how a 
whole system operates. It is the use of the explicit technical knowledge, through practical 
application, that translates into tacit knowledge or operational competence (Flin et al., 2008).  
The training of these non-technical skills or Human Factors have traditionally relied on an 
emphasis on theoretical lecture or classroom-based tuition (Flin et al., 2008). The individuals then 
use this technical knowledge and develop operational competence through practical application, 
initially utilising traditional drill sessions then practically at incidents.  
Training for effective decision-making during emergencies should include unexpected elements 
and unusual combinations of problems.  It should require a knowledge of emergency procedures 
but should also empower the Incident Commander with the competence and confidence to take 
command and to control the situation (Crichton and Flin, 2017).  
For over thirty years, studies into the use of simulation-based training (SBT) in high-hazard 
environments such as aviation and healthcare, (in conjunction with observation and feedback for 
learning and practice) has reduced the potential for human error and improved safety (Crichton, 
2017). However, it has been concluded that simulation-based exercises in themselves are not 
enough to train the expected behaviours (Salas et al., 1998). Training strategies, learning 
objectives and feedback from trained and competent observers are essential in developing 
decision-making behaviours which mitigate human error (Salas et al., 2004). Effective training 
must utilise scenarios which incorporate events to stimulate the practice and demonstration of 
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Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes (KSAs) (Flin 2008, Crichton 2017) which can provide the basis as 
feedback criteria.  
The UK Incident Command Manual (NOG, 2020) states that ‘Fire and rescue services should seek 
to validate the knowledge, skills and attributes of candidates following appropriate training, 
development and support for all levels of command. Operational assurance assessments to 
confirm competence should be carried out following suitable exposure of candidates to 
operational incidents’.  
Carrying out validation and assessment of competence should satisfy fire and rescue services that 
the candidates will deliver an assertive, safe, and effective, all-hazards command to safeguard 
the public and operational personnel. But the question of the composition of these assessments 
is less clear. The specific competences to be measured, and the way they should be valued, 
scored, or deemed as acceptable is not defined in the guidance documents. 
The Incident Command System (ICS), and how it operates within a wider framework of policies 
and an in-depth understanding of operational issues, is split into three functional areas (Buck et 
al., 2006). This basic philosophy is mirrored in all international ICSs, National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) from the United States (Jensen and Youngs, 2015) and Australasian 
Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) among others (Luke, 2016). These three 
functional areas are: 
● Command skills – considers the skills, knowledge and understanding required by an
Incident Commander, and the importance of developing and maintaining such
competencies
● Safety management – the principal consideration of the Incident Commander is the safety
of their personnel. When developing their tactical plans, the Incident Commander must
achieve an appropriate balance between the benefit of undertaking planned action and
the associated risks
● Organisation at an incident – this gives the Incident Commander a recognised system
from which to work, when organising and using personnel and resources at an incident
It clarifies the that the key aspects of operational deployment will require candidates to 
demonstrate the following competences: 
● Technical skills – personnel and commanders to have the required skills, knowledge and
understanding to perform their routine duties
● Command and control – to have the required skills, knowledge and understanding to
perform their duties on the incident ground
● Management and leadership skills – to be able to, manage their allotted activities,
prioritise, and balance the demands of the role and the ability to develop confident and
resilient students
● Working with others – be able to problem- solve and deal with change in an organised,
safe, and systematic way
● Multi-agency collaboration – to be able to work as part of a team and in partnership with
other agencies to save life, reduce harm and safeguard communities
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The key question is how to support the students in achieving these competences, when the role 
of the incident command trainer is as complex as the role they are teaching and assessing. It is 
important to find the balance between teaching quantitative technical knowledge and giving the 
student opportunities to demonstrate its application qualitatively. The knowledge or recalling of 
facts is only a small component of learning or the demonstration of expertise. The work of Bloom 
in the 1950s and 1960s (Bloom, 1956), later revised by (Anderson and Krathwohl, 2001), outlined 
six levels of knowledge in a taxonomy or hierarchy (detailed below). Bloom's Taxonomy classified 
thinking according to six cognitive levels of complexity. The levels are often perceived as a 
stairway, with trainers encouraging their students to climb to a higher tier of thought. The 
taxonomy is hierarchical; in that each level is subsumed by the higher levels.  
1. Remember - Retrieving, recognising, and recalling knowledge from long-term memory
2. Understanding - Constructing meaning from oral, written, and graphic messages
3. Applying - Carrying out or using a procedure through executing or implementing
4. Analysing - Breaking material into the constituent parts, determining how the parts fit
together
5. Evaluating - Making judgements based on criteria and standards through checking and
critiquing
6. Creating - Putting elements together to form a coherent or functional whole
When Incident Command competence is assessed through quantitative written tasks or 
examinations, it can be argued that this will only cover the ‘Remember and Understand’ tiers of 
Bloom’s Taxonomy. In contrast, qualitative competencies are utilised when incidents present 
unexpected challenges which fall outside of pre-defined organisational policy or procedure. 
Specifically, they will need to ‘create’ a bespoke solution to an incident based on their operational 
experience and training, which is influenced by the environment and circumstances facing them. 
However, the training received might only have covered the quantitative ‘Remember and 
Understand’ tiers of the hierarchy. Thus, leaving the incident risk assessment and subsequent 
decision making to be concluded through professional judgement or operational experience; 
when it has been well documented that incident numbers are falling (Knight 2013, Home Office, 
2019), thus leaving Incident Commanders ill-equipped to make such decisions. 
Effective Incident Commanders are required to retain knowledge on organisational culture, 
doctrine, policy and procedural framework; and their appropriate application at any incident 
(Brunacini, 2002). However, the most critical factor is the ability of Incident Commanders to make 
and execute decisions under time and consequential pressure (Hutton and Klein, 1999). 
The training and assessment of these qualitative skills (sometimes called non-technical skills or 
behavioural markers) within high-reliability industries are well-documented (Crichton 2017). 
Klampfer et al describe behavioural markers as ‘observable, non-technical behaviours that 
contribute to a superior or substandard performance within a work environment’ (Klampfer et 
al., 2001).  
Effective Command Behavioural Marker Framework 
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Effective Command was created as a behavioural marker framework in 2015 by two 
academic/fire service practitioners (UK and Australia), to address the disconnect between 
academic research and its application within the Fire Service. The aim was to develop a robust 
strategy to implement non-technical skills during Fire-officer training. It focuses on five key 
behaviours: Situational Awareness, Decision-making, Objective setting, Action behaviours and 
Review as identified by Launder and Perry (2014). These five key behaviours were then 
subdivided to form eight sections in the framework as detailed below in Table 1:  
Effective Command Methodology 
The Effective Command training methodology aligns with the five principles of simulation-based 
exercise team training, as outlined by Crichton (2017). 
● Principle 1 - Develop learning objectives and expected performance standards
Using scenarios, as outlined by Sarna (2002), Incident Commanders are presented with
unexpected events or dilemmas (Lamb, 2014). These cues stimulate the expected
behaviours and allow relevant behavioural markers to be practiced or demonstrated.
● Principle 2 - Train the team or individuals
Training the individual in non-technical skills is often overlooked during training and
development of Fire Officers
● Principle 3 - Use a structured observation tool
The structured observation tool Effective Command is used to capture positive
behaviours and those requiring improvement. The framework is also used as a basis of
the training design used to provide feedback, and for self-reflection by the student.
● Principle 4 - Provide feedback during a structured debrief.
Feedback is given face-to-face immediately following a scenario-based exercise, and
behaviours observed during the exercise are highlighted.
● Principle 5 - Repeat the training regularly
Organisations are advised to embed the use of the Effective Command framework in on-
station drills, live incident monitoring, large scale practical exercises and ongoing incident
command training and assessments; to continually train against the behavioural markers
identified.
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Applications of Effective Command 
The Effective Command tool collates data using 3 different applications: Training, Incident 
Monitoring and Formal Assessment. 
Training 
The participants completed self-reflective Effective Command reports following their 
completion of structured training. The participants received minimal training on how to 
use the tools. There was no standardisation of the assessment measures, as such this data 
is only indicative of the completion of the training rather than being deemed suitable for 
in-depth analysis. 
Incident Monitoring 
The participants within this group are all operational commanders who fulfil an incident 
monitoring role for their organisation. These monitoring officers were trained and 
standardised internally by their organisation, so there was an organisational consistency 
in ‘what good looks like’. However, this consistency was not present between different 
organisations. 
Formal Assessments 
As per the guidance document by Klampfer et al. (2001), all assessors were sector 
competent and received training in non-technical skills and the use of the Effective 
Command behavioural marker framework. These assessors were re-validated annually.  
Effective Command Framework 
The Effective Command framework (Effective Command, 2020) is aligned to UK National Fire 
Service competency role-maps and directly accredited by appropriate sector-specific awarding 
bodies (NOG, 2020). It is routinely used in both development and assessment of Fire Officers in 
the UK as well as in nine countries worldwide. Participants are scored in eight sections: each 
containing nine criteria (behavioural markers/technical competencies). There are five possible 
marks for each criterion, with a maximum score of forty-five achievable in each section, these 
are the guidance parameters. 
5/5 - Exceeding the expected behaviours of the role, continued professional development 
required to maintain. 
3/5 - Satisfactory behaviours of the role demonstrated, continued professional development 
required to improve. 
1/5 - Showing little or few of the expected behaviours, safety critical, significant development 
needed to reach a satisfactory level. 
The rationale for the key behaviours are explored through discussions between the candidate 
and the assessor. The specific behaviours required for each criterion is importantly not 
specified by the Effective Command framework, instead each organisational user must set the 
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parameters for ‘what good looks like’ themselves. Organisational culture, Fire Service 
topography and employee demographics (full-time, part-time and volunteers) will all affect the 
expectations and the competence acceptability profile. The overall aim is to achieve Assertive, 
Effective & Safe Incident Commanders (NOG, 2020) irrespective of incident type, the Effective 
Command tool permits that flexibility through its application. 
A percentage score was calculated for each section and the results were categorised using a 
traffic light system where Red shows a score of 55.5 %, Amber 55.5-70% and Green > 70%. 
These grade boundaries were selected based on expert opinion and organisational 
expectations. The overall assessment score is calculated according to the following rules:  
Red Result – Unsatisfactory 
If two safety critical failings (separate criteria scores of 1/5) were recorded in a single 
section, the candidate will fail the whole section. If 2 or more whole sections (1-8) were 
scored as red, then that will be an automatic fail of the whole assessment. 
Amber Result – Satisfactory 
If one section was recorded as red, regardless of the scores of the other sections the 
overall assessment result will be amber.  An amber result could also be achieved if the 
number of the overall section scores does not exceed four green results. 
Green Result – Exceeded Expectations 
Where five or more overall sections are scored as green, but no one section was scored 
as red. 
Data Collection 
During this study 169,657 separate criterion results (formal assessment, incident monitoring and 
training) were downloaded and processed in Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corporation, 2018), using 
standard descriptive statistical methods. A multivariate ANOVA test was performed using MS 
Excel to determine any significant statistical relationship between command level and mean 
score across the eight main sections. No significant relationship was found (p=0.567, CI = 0.074), 
and so it was concluded that no further statistical investigation was required. A possible reason 
for no statistical significance was due to the small sample size for L3 and L4, as visually there is a 
notable difference in responses, especially at L4. 
The dataset included data from fire services in the UK, Portugal, France, Italy, Estonia, Dubai, 
Singapore, Australia, and Canada. The services themselves represented wholetime and on-call 
(UK, Europe & Middle East) firefighters, volunteers (Canada and Australia), rural, urban and 
aviation fire departments (Singapore & Australia). The rank of the candidate, type and level of 
assessment, the score reached and the colour coding of that score was included.  
This study has focused on data generated from the formal assessments only. 1261 formal 
assessments were completed between January 2017 and May 2019. These encompass over 
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90,000 separate data entries at command levels L1-4 (NOG, 2020), and were recorded by 
accredited and annually verified assessors.  
● Level 1 - Operational (in command of 1-3 Appliances)
● Level 2 - Operational (in command of 4-6 Appliances)
● Level 3 - Tactical (in command of 6-10 Appliances)
● Level 4 - Strategic (in command of 11 + Appliances).
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Results 
Of the 1261 completed formal assessments analysed, 994 were L1 commanders, 208 at L2, 42 at 
L3 and 17 at L4. Whilst no significant statistical relationship was found through the statistical analysis 
(possibly due to the relatively small sample size for L3 and L4 officers), some differences  can be observed, 
and we have used these observations to inform our interpretation of the data. 
When we examine all data from the L1-4 formal assessments, approximately ten percent of 
participants failed to meet the minimum standard required to pass the assessment. Those that 
met the satisfactory minimum standard, were further broken down into Amber 53% (satisfactory) 
and Green 37% (exceeded expectations) groups.   
Further analysis at each command level highlights a fluctuation in failure rates (Fig. 1). The 
highest rate of failures was during the assessment of L2 Officers, 11.1%. Whereas failures of L3 
and L4 officers were 4.8% and 5.9% respectively. L4 officers were more likely to achieve a Green 
assessment outcome (exceed expectations) than the other levels of officers.  
When specific strengths and weaknesses at each level are examined across all assessment 
sections, the L2 officers appeared to perform the worst - with only 2.6% deviation between the 
highest and lowest scores across all assessment sections.  
While the L1, 2 and 3 officers showed strengths at the Information Gathering phase (section 1), 
the same officers were scored as less able during the Information Evaluation phase (section 3). 
The review phase (section 8) was another area of weakness for the L2 and L3 officers. There is an 
increase in mean score as Command Level increases (Fig. 2). Further analysis of a larger dataset 
will be needed before any significant conclusions can be made. 
L4 officers scored, on average, ten percent (range 9.1-12.1%) higher than officers at the other 
levels, across all the sections, 82.4% of all L4 officer assessments achieved a green ‘exceeds 
expectations’ outcome. 
The data can be further analysed to examine specific criteria or behavioural markers responsible 
for the assessment results. Table 2 shows the strengths and weaknesses identified from the L1 
assessments. There is a clear identification of key behavioural markers with several criteria 
determined as strengths in individuals who achieve satisfactory assessment outcomes, and as 
weaknesses in those individuals who fail to meet the required standard. The frequency of the 
criteria scores were recorded in either 1/5- 2/5 (Red score) or 3/5-5/5 (Amber/Green score). 
These behavioural markers were then sorted, highest to lowest. The highlighted cells appear on 
both the Strengths & Weaknesses list.  These key behavioural markers can strongly influence the 
outcome of an incident command assessment. 
The data presented in Table 2 shows the strengths and weaknesses in behaviours of L2 Officers. 
This data set is more varied, with only one assessment criteria found on both lists. This behaviour 
focuses on appropriate decision-making strategy being used to resolve the incident.  
At L3-4, the numbers were significantly smaller (Red Score L3 n=2, L4 n=1), and so no clear trend 
could be confidently extracted. 
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Discussion 
This study suggests that structured analysis of incident command assessment should inform 
subsequent training cycles, not only of individuals but of organisations and organisational 
procedures. The competence profile (breakdown of individuals classified as red, amber or green) 
presented in Fig. 1 is representative of every organisation involved in this study, suggesting that 
the demographics could be a fixed variable reflecting the ever-changing workforce due to 
promotions, retirements and new roles being created. Further study over subsequent years, 
where organisations are developing their personnel utilising this methodology, will enable us to 
determine: If training were focussed on the areas identified in Table 2 would this significantly 
alter the organisational command competence profile? 
For Incident command training and assessment to be delivered at the higher end of Bloom's 
Taxonomy, there will always be some level of subjectivity and therefore some variation or range 
in results. The development of tacit knowledge in line with the incident command competencies 
identified within the UK Incident Command manual will always be open to some local 
interpretation, and to some extent local circumstances. However, assessor training and 
standardisation will minimise that variation. Standardising ‘what good looks like’ will enable 
service-to-service comparisons in competence profiles and training methodologies, whilst 
accommodating localisms around response mobilising and procedures. 
One notable result, seen in Fig. 2, is the dip in overall competence scores between L1 and L2 
officers. This could partly be explained by the processes involved in fire service career 
progression. In the UK, L1 officers (Crew Manager, Watch Manager A&B) typically work as a part 
of a team, which has positive benefits in terms of confidence, collaboration, and sanity-checking 
at an incident.  
L2 officers respond to incidents individually and are much more isolated as Incident Commanders 
than their L1 counterparts. The development process to become a L2 officer is also typically rapid, 
compared to the gradual training and mentoring that occurs in the development of L1 officers, 
and L2 officers may well find themselves quickly out of their comfort zone.  
The data presented in this study provides a strong argument for a more supported development 
process for L2 officers, enabling them to grow into the role and competently manage the 
incident. 
In addition, there is a gradual improvement in officer competence from L2-4 officers. The 
individual competence scores increase gradually with progression through the ranks, suggesting 
that individuals are growing in both confidence and competence. This observation correlates with 
that of Canon-Bowers and Bell (1997) who identified the characteristics and mechanisms of an 
effective decision maker, and how experienced decision makers differ from that of a novice 
(Canon-Bowers and Bell, 1997). They suggest that expert decision makers can perform incident 
evaluation more quickly and accurately than novices. Two recognised aspects of this incident 
evaluation are cue and pattern recognition. Experts are better and faster at identifying the 
relevant cues, the significance of them, and the patterns that they form (Sinclair et al., 2012).  
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This observation is evident in the data presented in Fig. 2, where the individuals have developed 
their evaluation skills, and this is reflected in the improvement in organisational competence 
profile.  
One consideration is that current L4 officers developed their command skills during a time when 
there were considerably more incidents and their operational exposure was very high (Knight, 
2013).  Future work should follow these competence profiles over the next 10 years, as the 
incident exposure of all commanders is likely to reduce and, in many cases, have been replaced 
with simulation-based training. 
The analysis of the specific strengths and weaknesses in L1 commanders identified in Table 2 has 
identified six key behaviours, which when achieved well, can alter the overall assessment 
outcome from red to an amber/green result.  
This study suggests that improvements in areas of information comprehension and evaluation 
would have a big impact on the outcomes of these assessments. It is of note that learning 
objectives in analytical and evaluation skills are found towards the top of Bloom's Taxonomy. This 
suggests that higher incident or scenario exposure, with metacognitive understanding of the 
decision rationale (Lamb 2014) could reverse these weaknesses and turn them into individual 
strengths. 
Decision-making is both a key strength and weakness of L2 officers and requires further 
exploration. Typically, experienced L1 officers rely on recognition-primed decision making (RPD), 
to resolve their incidents enabling them to rapidly evaluate a situation and decide on the 
appropriate course of action in high-pressure situations (Zsambok and Klein, 1997, Hutton and 
Klein, 1999, Klein, 2008). Tactical (L2) and Strategic officers (L3 – 4), will more frequently make 
slower time analytical decisions, as the incident phase is less dynamic. Further exploration of this 
skills gap of inexperienced L2 officers could provide further insight, but also solutions to address 
this competence deficit.  
In addition, further studies specifically investigating these strength and weakness key areas 
during the L1 and L2 Incident Commander development are required. Through using this data, 
an organisation can invoke double loop learning, enabling them to change training mechanisms 
or philosophies to support more effective Incident Commander development. 
Summary 
Structured and holistic training and assessment systems, like Effective Command, provide a safe 
and efficient way of developing and assessing the competence of Incident Commanders. By 
analysing the data generated, identified areas of strength or weakness can be fed into 
subsequent training cycles, to maximise continual organisational development of their 
personnel.  By employing a consistent behavioural framework, the process of developing 
essential knowledge and decision-making behaviours begins earlier and ensures firefighters are 
safer and more effective, both immediately and as future officers. The behaviours examined 
through this study have been identified as critical in academic literature, Coronial Reviews and 
Royal Commissions. The development of these behaviours will significantly enhance the safety 
of operational personnel, the public and importantly can be used as evidence that an 
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organisation has learned from and addressed known risks to firefighters. A long-term study to 
investigate the impact and effectiveness of the Effective Command training system and its 
influence on improving the organisational competency profile, through the identification, 
training, and assessment of key behavioural markers, should be considered.  
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Assessment Sections Behavioural markers and Technical competencies areas 
1. Information
Gathering
The gathering of information from personnel handovers, 
briefings, multi-agency liaison, weather conditions, visual cues, 
and radio communication (Endsley 2000). 
2. Comprehension The understanding of the information gathered. 
3. Evaluation The evaluation of the incident, the anticipated speed of its 
progression and any likely impact resulting from the incident 
development or reduction. 
4. Decision-Making The methods by which the decisions were made, using 
procedures, the utilisation of other agencies, the role and 
management of the media, and the validity of the decisions 
made. 
5. Plan The setting of appropriate incident objectives, which 
considered suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. 
6. Communication Accurate communication maintained throughout the incident, 
which kept all relevant and multi-agency partners informed.  
7. Command the effective command of the whole incident, including the 
delegation of responsibilities for any necessary functions and 
investigations. 
8. Review Continually review incident progress against objectives, 
including the long-term effects of the incident on the 
organisation. 











































































Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Formal Assessment Data presented as a Percentage
Red Amber Green


































































































































Section Assessment Criteria Section Assessment Criteria 
1. Information Collection of initial information 
using relevant channels 
3.Evaluation Identified and understood 
implications of key risks and 
hazards 
7. Command Effective prioritisation of tasks 5. Plan Appropriate resources to 
meet the needs of the 
incident 
8. Review Modifications or introductions 
of changes, to incident plan 
1.Information Building 
layout/documentation 
2. Comprehension Risk assessment/understanding 
and safe systems of work 
utilised 
5. Plan Develop & implement risk 
control/contingency 
measures and utilise safe 
systems of work 
3.Evaluation Identified appropriate 
situational cues and 
information 
3. Evaluation Was able to source and 
interpret key cues in a timely 
manner 
2. Comprehension Suitability/sufficiency of 
resources 
4.Decision-making Decision involves – accurate 
situational awareness of 
hazards and risks present 
2. Comprehension Evolution/rate of incident 
change 
7. Command Appropriate incident 
structure 
3. Evaluation Was able to source and 
interpret key cues in a timely 
manner 
2.Comprehension Evolution/rate of incident 
change 
4.Decision-making Decision involves – accurate 
situational awareness of 
hazards and risks present 
2. Comprehension Suitability/sufficiency of 
resources 
5.Plan Develop & implement risk 
control/contingency measures 
and utilise safe systems of work 
3.Evaluation Identified appropriate 






4.Decision-making Appropriate decision -making 
and decision -control process 
utilised 
4.Decision-making Appropriate decision -
making and decision -control 
process utilised 
6.Communications Effective communication with 
all 
6.Communications Effective communication of 
overall plan, where 
appropriate, with other 
Multi-Agency commanders 
8.Review Collate relevant points for the 
debrief or possible 
investigation 
2.Comprehension Safety briefs, where 
appropriate, with other 
Multi-Agency commanders 
3.Evaluation Able to predict progression of 
key risks and hazards 
4.Decision-making Decisions are timely 
5.Plan Develop & implement risk 
control/contingency measures 
and utilise safe systems of work 
3.Evaluation Considered wider incident 
implications – cover moves, 
road closures, early joint 
media strategy 
7.Command Effective prioritisation of tasks 6.Communications Establish an effective 
communication plan 
6.Communications Incident Handover 2.Comprehension Risk assessment/ 
understanding and safe 
systems of work utilised 
7.Command Delegation of tasks/sectors 5.Plan Develop appropriate tactics 
4.Decision-making Decision involves – accurate 
situational awareness of 
hazards and risks present 
5.Plan Strategies developed that 
are aligned to objectives, 
consider a joint Multi-
Agency working strategy 
5.Plan Appropriate FRS resources to 
meet the needs of the incident 
8.Review Reviewed the effectiveness 
of current strategy and 
tactics 
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